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Catching Up with the Past:
Recent Decisions of the
Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Addressing
Gross Human Rights
Violations Perpetrated
During the 1970-1980s
Claudia Martin*
1. Introduction
In recent judgments, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter
'Inter-American Court' or 'Court') has decided cases involving gross violations
of human rights perpetrated during periods of political violence in El Salvador,
Chile and Paraguay during the 1970s and 1980s. The first case, Serrano Cruz
Sisters,1 involved the capture and subsequent disappearance of two minor
sisters during the internal armed conflict in El Salvador. The second case,
Almonacid-Arellano et al.,2 was related to the extrajudicial execution of a
political dissident during the Pinochet military dictatorship in Chile and the
subsequent application of an amnesty law to the alleged perpetrators of the
crime. The third case, Goiburil et al.,3 involved the forced disappearance of
*Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and Professorial Lecturer
in Residence, American University, Washington College of Law. I would like to thank the
research assistance of Jessica Farb and the editing support and comments provided by Janette
Allen.
1 Serrano Cruz Sisters v El Salvador, Preliminary Objections, IACtHR Series C 118 (2004).
2 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v Chile IACtHR Series C 154 (2006).
3 Goiburt et al. v Paraguay IACtHR Series C 153 (2006).
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four political opponents of the military regime of General Stroessner in
Paraguay, who were arrested and later disappeared within the framework
of 'Operation Condor'. The facts in these cases transpired before El Salvador,
Chile and Paraguay had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.4
Following the practice of other States 5 that had faced similar political turmoil,
these three States incorporated temporal limitations in their declarations of
acceptance of jurisdiction to exclude from the Court's jurisdiction gross human
rights violations perpetrated during violent political times. Though the scope of
the limitations asserted by the three States is different, the Court found
that some of the facts involved in those cases fell within its jurisdiction.
Although prior to these judgments the Court had heard other cases
involving gross human rights violations perpetrated before the respondent
State had ratified the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 (American
Convention' or 'Convention') and/or recognised the compulsory jurisdiction
of this tribunal,6 the cases under analysis present special issues regarding the
jurisdiction rationae temporis of the Court. First, the scope of the temporal limita-
tions asserted by El Salvador and Chile raise problems of interpretation that
were never addressed by the Court in its case law before. Second, though
the Court considered forced disappearances as continuous violations for pur-
poses of jurisdiction in other decisions, the Court had not established the
point at which the crime of forced disappearance crystallised as an autonomous
human rights violation by States. Furthermore, the three cases under analysis
were decided within a short time span, which leaves room for comparisons
to be drawn among the judgments in those cases. Finally, the three selected
cases involve other issues that are relevant for the current evolution of interna-
tional human rights law, such as the notion of crimes against humanity
and the obligation to punish the perpetrators of such crimes, the scope of
the duty to investigate when the alleged perpetrators are residing outside
the jurisdiction of the concerned State and the nature of the crime of forced
disappearance.
For background purposes, this article will provide first a short account
of the facts of the cases. Second, it will analyse the decisions in regard to the
4 El Salvador had ratified the American Convention by the time of the alleged disappearance of
the Serrano Cruz Sisters. However, Chile and Paraguay had not ratified the Convention at the
time of the murder of Almonacid-Arrellano and the disappearance of GoiburOi et al.
El Salvador ratified the Convention on 20 June 1978 and recognised the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court on 6 June 1995. Chile ratified the American Convention and recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on 21 August 1990. Paraguay ratified the American
Convention on 24 August 1989 and recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on
26 March 1993.
5, See, for example, the declarations of Argentina, Nicaragua and Mexico available at: www.
oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html.
6 See, inter alia, Moiwana Community v Suriname IACtHR Series C 124 (2005); 14 IHRR 454
(2007); and Plan de Sdnchez Massacre v Guatemala IACtHR Series C 105 (2004); 13 IHRR 986
(2006).
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jurisdiction rationae temporis of the Court. Third, it will review the Court's
determination that certain human rights violations constitute crimes against
humanity and the implications of this characterisation. Next, the article will
explore the Court's holding that the obligation to investigate crimes against
humanity entails a duty to request the extradition of the alleged perpetrators
who reside outside the State's jurisdiction. Finally, the article will review
the Court's decision that forced disappearances became an autonomous
human rights violation in international human rights law enforceable as such,
even before the existing treaties on this crime were adopted.
2. Facts of the Cases
The facts in the Serrano Cruz Sisters case transpired during the internal
armed conflict that affected El Salvador from 1980 to 1991. Sisters Ernestina
and Erlinda Serrano Cruz ('Serrano Cruz sisters'), who were seven and three
years old respectively, were allegedly captured, kidnapped and disappeared
by members of the Batall6n Atlacatl of the Salvadoran army on or after 2 June
1982, during a military operation known as the 'Cleansing Operation' or 'May
Stampede' that took place in San Antonio de La Cruz, Chalatenango
Department, from 27 May to 9 June 1982. As a result of the May Stampede,
the Serrano Cruz family fled their home to save their lives. Maria Victoria Cruz
Franco, the Serrano Cruz sisters' mother, and one of her sons were the only
family members who successfully crossed the military fence to another town,
Manaquil. The rest of the family joined a group to traverse the mountains
toward safety in 'Los Alvarenga'. They spent three days on the journey with
very little food and water, often hiding for safety. The Serrano Cruz sisters
were accompanied by their father, Dionisio Serrano and their siblings, Enrique
Serrano Cruz and Suyapa Serrano Cruz, who carried her six-month old baby.
Suyapa chose to divert from the path the rest of the family took because
she did not want to attract attention to the group with her crying baby. At the
insistence of the Serrano Cruz sisters, Dionisio and Enrique went to search
for water at a canyon. Left alone, the girls began to cry and were found by
El Salvador military troops. The whereabouts of the Serrano Cruz sisters
remain unknown 25 years after they were allegedly captured by state officials.
Maria Victoria was unable to bring a complaint before the Chalatenango
Trial Court until 30 April 1993, because she was living with Suyapa in a
Honduran refugee camp and the events took place during a time period in
which El Salvador's judicial system was not in operation. On 13 November 1995,
Maria Victoria brought a habeas corpus claim before the Salvadoran
Constitutional Supreme Court of Justice, but that court dismissed her
claim since it was not the proper court to investigate the whereabouts of
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the girls. The criminal investigation into their disappearance has failed to estab-
lish the fate of the Serrano Cruz sisters.
Almonacid-Arellano et al. involved the death of Luis Almonacid-Arellano,
an elementary school teacher, member of the Chilean Communist Party and
union leader who was murdered by members of the police following his
arrest at his home on 16 September 1973. These events transpired in the city
of Rancagua, Chile, a few days after a coup d'etat overthrew President
Allende, and were carried out as part of the wide repression unleashed by the
Pinochet military dictatorship against alleged opponents to the new regime.
Although a criminal investigation was opened as a result of the murder of
Mr Almoncid-Arellano in 1973, the case was ultimately dismissed in September
1974 without ever having identified or punished the perpetrators. On 18 April
1978, the de facto government passed Decree Law No. 2191 (Amnesty Law')
granting amnesty to perpetrators of criminal acts carried out from
11 September 1973 until 10 March 1978.7 Some criminal acts were excluded
from the application of the Amnesty Law.
8
In 1992, the victim's wife requested the reopening of the case and brought
charges against the two alleged perpetrators before the First Criminal Court of
Rancagua. In September 1996, the Second Military Court of Santiago requested
the First Criminal Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over the case on the basis
that, at the time of the murder, the two alleged perpetrators were on active duty
under military jurisdiction. Moreover, the Military Court stated that, when Mr
Almonacid-Arellano was killed, there was in effect a state of emergency, which
should be construed as a state or time of war; thus, the military court had jur-
isdiction over the investigation of his murder. In December 1996, the Supreme
Court of Chile confirmed the transfer of jurisdiction from the civilian courts to
the military courts. In January 1997, the military courts ordered the dismissal
and closing of the investigation, applying the Amnesty Law, which was con-
firmed by the Court-Martial. A motion for review filed with the Supreme Court
was dismissed on the grounds that it was time-barred.
In recent years, several bills have been submitted to amend or repeal the
Amnesty Law, but it was still in force at the time the Court issued its judgment
on this case. However, there have been several cases since 1998 in which the
Chilean courts have not applied the amnesty law.
7 Decree Law No. 2191 states:
Section 1 - Amnesty shall be granted to all individuals who performed illegal acts,
whether as perpetrators, accomplices or accessories after the fact, during the state of
siege in force from September 11 1973 to March 10 1978, provided they are not
currently subject to legal proceedings or have been already sentenced.
Section 2 - Amnesty shall be further granted to those individuals who, to the date of
this Decree Law, have been sentenced by military courts, after September 11 1973.
8 For example, robbery aggravated by violence or intimidation, rape and embezzlement were
excluded from the application of the Amnesty Law.
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Lastly, Goiburii et al. concerned the detention, torture and subsequent
disappearance of Agustin Goiburdi Gim6nez, Carlos Jos6 Mancuello Bareiro
and brothers Rodolfo Feliciano and Benjamin de Jesds Ramirez Villalba
('Ramirez Villalba brothers'), who were political dissidents during the Alfredo
Stroessner Matiauda dictatorship. The victims were subjected to forced disap-
pearance by Paraguayan authorities with the support of Argentine security
forces, within the framework of 'Operation Condor'. The Stroessner dictatorship,
lasting from 1954 to 1989, was responsible for the 'systematic practice of
arbitrary detention, prolonged imprisonment without trial, torture and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment, death during torture and the political assas-
sination of individuals who were said to be "subversive" or against the regime'.
9
The respondent State's actions in this case occurred within the context
of Operation Condor, as revealed by the Terror Files.10 The Court described
Operation Condor as the 'code name given to the alliance of the security
forces and intelligence services of the Southern Cone dictatorships in their
repression of and fight against individuals designated "subversive elements" , 1
The operation involved 'clandestine coordination between the "security forces
and military personnel and intelligence services" of the region'.12 In Paraguay,
Operation Condor was led by the Department of Military Intelligence.
Goiburfi Gim6nez, Mancuello Bareiro and the Ramirez Villalba brothers
were all disappeared as part of a practice 'in which agents of the Paraguayan
State illegally detained, maintained incommunicado, tortured and disappeared
individuals whose political activities were opposed to General Stroessner's
regime or who were identified as his enemies'.1 3 Goiburdi was a doctor, a
Colorado Party member and founder of an opposition party against Stroessner.
While living and practicing his profession in Argentina, Goiburdi was arbitrarily
detained by Argentine security forces on 9 February 1977, under Operation
Condor, handed over to Paraguayan officials who transferred him to the
Asuncion Police Investigations Department where he was held incommunicado,
tortured and then disappeared. Mancuello Bareiro was a Paraguayan citizen
detained on 25 November 1974, with his wife and baby, as they passed
through Paraguayan customs on his return from Argentina, where he was
studying engineering. On 25 November 1974, Paraguay similarly detained
Benjamin RamirezVillalba on his way to Paraguay from Argentina and detained
his brother, Rodolfo, in Asunci6n. The State accused Mancuello Bareiro and
the Ramirez Villalba brothers of conspiring to kill Stroessner in a terrorist
group allegedly led by Goiburfi. The three men were detained in several govern-
ment offices, including the Investigations Department, where they were
9 Goiburzi et al., supra n. 3 at para. 61.3.
10 Ibid. at paras 61.6-61.7.
11 Ibid. at para. 61.6.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. at para. 61.14.
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detained for 22 months, tortured, held incommunicado and later disappeared.
The criminal proceedings for all the victims only resulted in judgments
against violators who were subsequently granted parole, already deceased,
not extradited from other countries or remained in the system due to continuing
proceedings. The respondent State acknowledged its international responsibility
for the forced disappearance of the four victims in this case.
3. jurisdiction Rationae Temporis
The three cases analysed in this article raised issues regarding the jurisdiction
rationae temporis of the Court with respect to facts that transpired before the
respondent States recognised the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
Before moving onto an analysis of the different aspects of these cases,
it is relevant to explore briefly the special characteristics of the contentious
jurisdiction of the Court and how this tribunal has been shaping its power
to assert that jurisdiction in recent years. The scope of the contentious jurisdic-
tion of the Court is established in Article 62 of the American Convention
and provides the power of the Court to interpret and apply the provisions of
the American Convention. 4 States may submit a unilateral declaration
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court upon ratification of the Convention or at
a subsequent time.1 5 Once a declaration is made it cannot be withdrawn.
In the cases of Ivcher-Bronstein v Peru and Constitutional Court v Peru,16 related
14 Article 62, Convention provides:
1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this
Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto,
and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters
relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention.
2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a
specified period, or for specific cases. It shall be presented to the Secretary General of
the Organization, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other member states of the
Organization and to the Secretary of the Court.
3. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation
and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided
that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction,
whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special
agreement.
15 The Court has consistently recognised the optional nature of the acceptance of its compul-
sory jurisdiction. In Cantos vArgentina, Preliminary Objections, IACtHR Series C 85 (2001);
11 IHRR 434 (2004) at para. 34, the Court stated that 'it is evident from the text of the
Convention that a State may be a party to it and accept or reject the obligatory jurisdiction
of the Court. Article 62 of the Convention uses the verb 'may' to signify that acceptance of
the jurisdiction is optional'. See also Alfonso Martin del Campo Dodd v Mexico, Preliminary
Objections, IACtHR Series C 113 (2004); 14 IHRR 425 (2007) at para. 68.
16 Ivcher-Bronstein v Peru, Competence, IACtHR Series C 54 (1999); and Constitutional Court v
Peru Competence, IACtHR Series C 55 (1999): 7 IHRR 751 (2000).
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to the attempted withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Court by the Fujimori
regime ruling Peru at the time, the Court concluded that there is no provision
in the American Convention that allows States that have accepted its
compulsory jurisdiction to withdraw such acceptance.17 Thus, 'the only avenue
[that a] State has to disengage itself from the Court's binding contentious
jurisdiction is to denounce the Convention as a whole"18 as provided byArticle
78 of the American Convention. 19 Moreover, the Court held that Article 62
authorises States to restrict their acceptance to its jurisdiction only on the
basis of the limitations expressly stipulated in that provision, namely: (1) on con-
dition of reciprocity; (2) for a specific period of time; and (3) for specific cases.2 °
Arguably, other non-stipulated limitations are not authorised by the Convention
and therefore invalid. Because of the special nature of the American Convention
as a human rights treaty, the international resolution of human rights
cases under this instrument cannot be assimilated to the settlement of inter-
State disputes at the International Court of Justice. Thus, no analogy can be
drawn from State practice under the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, particularly with regard to States' wide discretion to insert limitations
to their acceptance of jurisdiction. 21
The Court has also asserted its inherent power to review whether limitations
inserted into a State's acceptance of its compulsory jurisdiction are compatible
with the Convention and thereby valid.2 2 In making this analysis, the
Court must consider the object and purpose of the Convention as a human
rights treaty.23 Moreover, it must ensure that Article 62, which is essential to
the effectiveness of the international protection mechanism, 'be interpreted
and applied so that the guarantee it establishes is truly practical and effective,
bearing in mind the special nature of human rights treaties and their
collective implementation'.24 Lastly, the Court has constantly reiterated that
17 Ivcher-Bronstein, ibid. at para. 39; and Constitutional Court, ibid. at para. 38.
18 Ivcher-Bronstein, ibid. at para. 40; and Constitutional Court, ibid. at para. 39.
19 Article 78, Convention provides:
1. The States Parties may denounce this Convention at the expiration of a five-year
period from the date of its entry into force and by means of notice given one year in
advance. Notice of the denunciation shall be addressed to the Secretary General of the
Organization, who shall inform the other States Parties.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party concerned
from the obligations contained in this Convention with respect to any act that may
constitute a violation of those obligations and that has been taken by that state prior to
the effective date of denunciation.
20 lvcher-Bronstein, supra n. 16 at para. 36; and Constitutional Court, supra n. 16 at para. 35.
21 Ivcher-Bronstein, ibid. at paras 47-48; and Constitutional Court, ibid. at paras 46-47
22 Ivcher-Bronstein, Competence, ibid. at para. 34; and Constitutional Court, Competence, ibid. at
para. 33. See also, Constantine et al. v Trinidad and Tobago, Preliminary Objections, IACtHR
Series C 82 (2001); 10 1HRR 1068 (2003) at para. 69.
23 Ivcher-Bronstein, ibid. at para. 46; and Constitutional Court. ibid. at para. 45.
24 Ivcher-Bronstein, ibid. at para. 37; and Constitutional Court, ibid. at para. 36.
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limitations to a declaration of acceptance to its contentious jurisdiction are
not technically the same as reservations to multilateral treaties;25 they are
only limitations, which appear to carry different legal consequences from
reservations.
26
In that context, for a number of years there was uncertainty regarding
the validity of temporal limitations which restricted the jurisdiction of the
Court to facts that occurred after the State's declaration of acceptance.
These types of limitations appeared not to fall within the authorised
restrictions identified by the Court. In the Serrano Cruz Sisters Case, however,
the Court concluded that these temporal limitations are valid because they
fall within the language of Article 62 authorising States to restrict their accep-
tance for a 'specific period of time'.27 The Court reiterated this conclusion
in Almonacid-Arellano et al.28 This holding is consistent with the Court's position
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction rationae temporis. In general, the Court
has stated that the principle of non-retroactivity enshrined in Article 28 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 applies to the determination
29of its jurisdiction to hear a case, even if a State has not inserted a temporal
restriction to its declaration of acceptance.30 According to that principle,
the Court is prevented from reviewing facts or acts that preceded a State's
acceptance of its compulsory jurisdiction. The only exception to this principle
is the existence of continuous or permanent violations that continue in
time even if they commenced before a State's acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.31
In the three cases under analysis in this article, the respondent States-El
Salvador, Paraguay, and Chile-inserted temporal limitations in their declara-
tions of acceptance to exclude from the Court's consideration facts that tran-
spired during periods of political turmoil in those countries-internal armed
conflict in El Salvador and repressive military dictatorships in Paraguay and
Chile. The scope of the restrictions in these three cases, however, was different
and consequently had different implications for the outcomes of these cases.
In the case of El Salvador, the restriction excluded facts and legal acts that
25 Cantos, supra n. 15 at para. 34; and Alfonso Martin del Campo Dodd, supra n. 15 at para. 68.
26 In Serrano Cruz Sisters, supra n. 1 at para. 61, the Court stated: "Recognition of the jurisdic-
tion of the Court... is a unilateral act of each State, qualified by the terms of the American
Convention as a whole and, therefore, not subject to reservations. Although some legal
doctrine speaks of "reservations" to the recognition of the international court's jurisdiction,
in fact this refers to limitations to the recognition of that jurisdiction and not technically to
reservations to a multilateral treaty'
27 Ibid. at para. 73.
28 Almonacid-Arellano et al., supra n. 2 at para. 44.
29 Jean and Bosico Children v Dominican Republic IACtHR Series C 130 (2005); 14 IHRR 724
(2007) at para. 104.
30 Nogueira de Carvalho et al. v Brazil IACtHR Series C 161 (2006) at para. 43.
31 jean and Bosico Children, supra n. 29 at paras 105-6; Moiwana Community supra n. 6 at paras
38-39; and Nogueira de Carvalho, ibid. at paras 44-45.
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occurred before the State's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction and those
which commenced before that critical date, even if they continued after
the State's acceptance.3 2 Since the alleged capture of the Serrano Cruz
Sisters occurred before the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, the State con-
tended that this tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the facts of the case.
Additionally, the State argued that even if the Court considered the facts in
this case as continuous and permanent violations-forced disappearances-
it would still lack jurisdiction to hear the case because the alleged disappear-
ances commenced before El Salvador's acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of this tribunal. Next, the State argued that the suffering of the
minors' next of kin as well as the alleged failure to investigate, prosecute
and punish the perpetrators were related to the forced disappearances and
therefore remained excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court because they
were not independent facts. Likewise, the criminal investigation instigated
by the sisters' mother was opened in 1993, before El Salvador recognised
the jurisdiction of the Court. Ultimately, the State argued that the restriction
was a valid reservation since the other State Parties to the American
Convention had not objected to it after being notified of its submission.
Petitioners and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ('Inter-
American Commission' or 'Commission'), on the other hand, contended
that the limitation asserted by El Salvador was incompatible with the object
and purpose of the American Convention because it prevented the Court
from reviewing crimes against humanity perpetrated in that country, such as
forced disappearances. Alternatively, they argued that even if the restriction
was considered valid, the Court still had jurisdiction to review independent
violations that had occurred after El Salvador's acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction, especially those related to the failure to afford access to justice and
judicial protection to victims and their next of kin.
In response to the State's arguments, the Court reiterated that limitations
incorporated into declarations of acceptance of its compulsory jurisdiction
are not reservations. Thus, it held that the fact that other States have not chal-
lenged the restriction introduced by El Salvador did not prevent this tribunal
32 El Salvador's declaration reads as follows:
I The Government of El Salvador accepts as binding ipso facto and not requiring
special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, or 'Pact of San Jose'.
II The Government of El Salvador, when recognizing this jurisdiction, places on
record that its recognition is for an indefinite period, on the condition of reciprocity,
and with the reservation that the cases in which it accepts the jurisdiction include
only and exclusively subsequent juridical facts and acts or juridical facts and acts
which commence subsequent to the date of deposit of this Declaration of
Recognition....
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from examining the compatibility of such a limitation with the American
Convention. The Court concluded that in this case the temporal limitation
inserted by El Salvador was valid in accordance with the stipulations of
Article 62 of the American Convention and the principle of non-retroactivity
set out in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.
33
In its holding, the Court failed to consider the argument made by the
petitioners regarding the incompatibility of El Salvador's limitation with the
object and purpose of the Convention. The Court only stated that, unlike
another case in which it had found the State's limitation invalid because it sub-
ordinated the application of the Convention to the domestic jurisdiction,
El Salvador's limitation permitted the Court to assess if the facts of a particular
case fall within its jurisdiction.34 In conclusion, the Court found that the
facts related to the alleged capture or disappearance of the Serrano Cruz sisters
were excluded from its jurisdiction. The Court, however, found jurisdiction
to review additional independent facts related to the judicial proceedings
initiated to investigate the disappearance of the minors, which started
after El Salvador's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court. These independent
facts included a habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court's rejection of the peti-
tion, as well as certain measures adopted in the criminal investigation
which intended to obstruct and delay the proceedings. Ultimately, the Court in
its decision on the merits found that these facts resulted in a breach of the rights
to judicial protection and a fair trial, protected byArticles 8 (1) and 25, in relation
to 1 (1) of the American Convention.3 5
In the case of Chile, the language of the restriction was very similar to
El Salvador's. It stated that Chile grants jurisdiction to the Court in regard 'only
to events which were subsequent to' the date on which the declaration was
deposited (21 August 1990) 'or, in any case, to events which started after
March 11, 1990'. Unlike the Serrano Cruz Sisters Case where the human rights
violation involved was a forced disappearance, that is to say, a continuous
and permanent violation, in Almonacid-Arellano, the victim was illegally
arrested and later arbitrarily deprived of his life. Thus, neither the Commission
nor the petitioners argued that the Court had jurisdiction to deal with the
detention and death of the victim. Both the Commission and the petitioners
33 1155 UNTS 331.
34 The Court referred to the Constantine et al., supra n. 22 at para. 79, in which it held that the
limitation inserted by Trinidad and Tobago to its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court
was general in scope and subordinated the application of the American Convention to the
domestic legislation as interpreted by the domestic courts. The declaration of Trinidad and
Tobago read '[T]he Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, recognizes the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights... only to such
extent that recognition is consistent with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago; and provided that Judgment of the Court does not infringe,
create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen:
35 Serrano-Cruz Sisters v El Salvador IACtHR Series C 120 (2005).
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focused instead on the violations that occurred subsequent to Chile's
acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, particularly the specific and
independent violations arising out of the denial of justice. The State challenged
those assertions by arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the criminal
investigation because it is 'a single and ongoing unity which is permanent in
time' 36 that cannot be divided or separated which started immediately
after the murder of Mr Almonacid-Arellano in September 1973. In response to
this argument, the Court noted that 'during the course of a proceeding
separate facts might occur which constitute specific and independent violations
arising from denial of justice"37 Thus, the Court concluded that it had jurisdic-
tion to hear certain facts related to the criminal investigation which occurred
subsequent to Chile's declaration of acceptance, in particular those related to
the transfer of the case to the military courts and the application of the
Amnesty Law to this case by the military courts. The Court also asserted its
jurisdiction to review whether keeping the Amnesty Law in force after the
State ratified the Convention and recognised the Court's jurisdiction breached
the duty to adjust domestic legislation to the provisions of the Convention
enshrined in Article 2. Ultimately, the Court found that the enforcement of the
Amnesty Law violated the right to judicial protection and a fair trial, as well as
the duty to adjust domestic legislation to the Convention.
Paraguay's declaration of recognition of the Court's jurisdiction also included
a temporal limitation.38 Unlike the El Salvador and Chile restrictions, however,
this limitation only prevented the Court from reviewing facts that occurred
before the State's acceptance of this tribunal's jurisdiction. Thus, violations of a
continuous or permanent nature, such as forced disappearances, can in princi-
ple be heard by the Court. In Goiburti et al., Paraguay partially acknowledged
international responsibility for the facts that transpired in this case and
acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of the continuous and
permanent nature of the forced disappearances perpetrated against the victims.
The State acknowledged that the basis of the Court's jurisdiction arose from
the American Convention and the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearances of Persons 199439 ('Convention on Forced Disappearances'),
ratified by Paraguay on 26 November 1996. Notwithstanding the acknowledg-
ment of the State regarding its responsibility for the forced disappearances
and the failure to provide judicial protection within a reasonable time,
the Court decided that the gravity of the facts and the need to establish the
36 Almonacid-Arellano et al., supra n. 2 at para. 39.
37 Ibid. at para. 48.
38 Paraguay's declaration stated that it recognised the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights 'for an indefinite period of time and which should be interpreted in
accordance with the principles of International Law in the sense that this recognition refers
expressly to acts that occurred after the deposit of this instrument and only for cases in which
there exists reciprocity' [emphasis added].
39 (1994) 33 ILM 1539.
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truth with regard to 'Operation Condor' compelled the tribunal to include
a chapter detailing the facts that transpired in this case. Additionally, the
Court found violations to the rights to humane treatment of the victims' next of
kin and to judicial protection and a fair trial, protected by Articles 5, 25 and 8
of the American Convention, in relation to the general duty to ensure established
in Article 1 (1).
4. Crimes Against Humanity
In Almonacid-Arellano, the Court found for the first time that certain
crimes committed in the context of a generalised and systematic attack
against civilians amount to crimes against humanity and therefore impose
upon the State a duty to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators.
40
This obligation cannot be overridden by the application of amnesty laws or
similar domestic provisions excluding criminal liability for the perpetrators.
The Court held similarly in Miguel Castro-Castro Prison4 1 and in La Cantuta.
4 2
The Court concluded that the extrajudicial execution of Mr Almonacid-
Arellano was part of a generalised and systematic practice by the military
authorities in Chile to attack sectors of the civilian population considered
opponents to the regime and thus constituted a crime against humanity.
The Court reasoned that murder was considered a crime against humanity in
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 1945,43 even if at the time a war nexus
was required. The scope of crimes against humanity and the binding nature
under international law of the principles recognised by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and its judgments were subsequently confirmed by
UN General Assembly Resolution 95(I) 4 4 and by the International Law
Commission, which in 1950 formulated the Principles of International
40 In previous cases, the Court has stated that the practice of forced disappearances constituted
a crime against humanity. However, the Court has never made a reasoned analysis finding a
human rights violation under the Convention a crime against humanity and the implica-
tions of that determination. In Gdmez Palomino v Peru IACtHR Series C 136 (2005) at para.
92, note 66, for example, the Court indicated in a footnote that the Convention on Forced
Disappearances considers the practice of forced disappearances a crime against humanity.
Additionally, the Court in Serrano Cruz Sisters, supra n. 1 at para. 103, and Goibura, supra
n. 3 at para. 82, held that a forced disappearance that is part of a pattern or practice of
disappearances constitutes a crime against humanity Finally, though the Inter-American
Commission and the petitioners argued that the extrajudicial executions perpetrated against
members of an indigenous community in Plan de Sdnchez Massacre, supra n. 6 at para. 51,
constituted genocide, the Court refused to rule on that matter stating that it lacked jurisdic-
tion rationae materiae. The Court, however, found that the massacre was part of a pattern of
committing these kinds of acts and therefore involved an aggravated international responsi-
bility for the State.
41 Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v Peru IACtHR Series C 160 (2006) at paras 403-05.
42 La Cantuta v Peru Merits, Reparations and Costs, IACtHR Series C 162 (2006) at para. 225.
43 82 UNTS 279.
44 GA Res. 95(I), 11 December 1946.
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Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment
of the Tribunal.4 5 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that subsequent interna-
tional practice has defined crimes against humanity as certain inhuman
acts, including murder, committed in a context of a generalised or systematic
attack against civilians, perpetrated both during peace and in war time.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that this international law rule was binding
upon States by the time Mr Almonacid-Arellano was killed by state officials
in September 1973. Since the murder of the victim was perpetrated within a
framework of generalised and systematic repression, which resulted in
the execution and disappearance of more than 3,000 victims, Mr Almonacid-
Arellano's deprivation of life constituted a crime against humanity under inter-
national law.
Second, the Court concluded that the prohibition of crimes against humanity
has attained the level of jus cogens and, consequently, there is an obligation
to punish such crimes pursuant to general principles of international law.
In the case of the American Convention, the duty to investigate, prosecute and
punish the perpetrators of crimes against humanity arises out of Article 1(1).
As a consequence of this obligation, '[s]tates must prevent, investigate and
punish all violations of the rights recognised by the Convention and, at the
same time, guarantee the reinstatement, if possible, of the violated rights,
and as the case may be, the reparation of the damage caused due to the violation
of human rights'.46 The Court stated that it is apparent from international
practice and its own case law, especially the Barrios Altos Case,4 7 that the adop-
tion and enforcement of amnesty laws prevents compliance with the duty
to punish the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and, as a result, amnesty
laws are not applicable to crimes under current international law.
Next, the Court found that the Chilean Amnesty Law granted amnesty
to perpetrators of certain crimes against humanity, including murder,4 8 and
therefore was incompatible with the obligations arising out of the American
Convention and engaged the international responsibility of the State. Moreover,
the Court stated that, given its nature, the Amnesty Law 'does not have any
legal effect and cannot remain as an obstacle for the investigation of the facts
inherent to the instant case, or for the identification and punishment of those
responsible thereof
49
Finally, it concluded that under the duty arising out of Article 2, which imposes
a legislative obligation to revise any domestic laws or practices that are in
breach of the American Convention, the State must repeal the Amnesty Law.
45 (1950) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, at 374-8.
46 Almonacid-Arellano, supra n. 2 at para. 110.
47 Barrios-Altos v Peru IACtHR Series C 75 (2001); 10 IHRR 487 (2003).
48 Although not a part of the case under analysis, the Court also considered that the Chilean
Amnesty Law could not be applied to prevent the investigation of other crimes against
humanity such as forced disappearance and torture.
49 Almonacid-Arellano, supra n. 2 at para. 119.
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The Court acknowledged that the law was a self-amnesty passed by a military
regime to prevent the prosecution of its members; however, it concluded that
since the ratification of the American Convention in 1990 the State had kept
the Amnesty Law in force in absolute breach of Convention rights. Even if the
Amnesty Law had not been applied by domestic courts in recent times, keeping
it in force as a part of the State's legislation was contrary to the wording and spirit
of the Convention and thereby a breach of Article 2.
The Court indicated that when the legislative power fails to set aside laws
that are contrary to the American Convention, the judiciary still must respect
the duty to 'ensure' arising out of Article 1(1). Domestic courts must ensure
that domestic laws and practices are in compliance with the American
Convention. To avoid engaging the international responsibility of the State,
domestic courts must ensure that those laws and practices are not in breach
of the Convention, in which case they must refrain from enforcing them.
In accomplishing that control, domestic courts must take into account both
the Convention and the case law of the Court when interpreting the scope of
the provisions of that treaty. In the case under analysis, the domestic courts
failed to provide such control and applied the Amnesty Law, which had
the effect of closing the investigation; consequently, the trial and punishment
of the perpetrators of Mr Almonacid-Arellano's murder was not pursued. As a
result, the victims' rights to judicial protection and a fair trial protected
by Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention were violated. Similarly,
the State failed to respect the general obligation enshrined in Article 1(1),
according to which the State must investigate, identify and punish the perpetra-
tors of human rights violations. This is especially important in cases which
involve the perpetration of crimes against humanity. The Court also found
that the transfer of the case to military jurisdiction constituted an additional
violation of Article 8(1) since the State failed to afford the victims their right to
be heard by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal.
As part of the reparations, the Court ordered the State to ensure that
the Amnesty Law be left without legal effect so that it does not continue to
hinder the investigation of Mr Almonacid-Arellano's murder or other similar
violations of human rights perpetrated in Chile during the military regime.
Additionally, it ordered the State to set aside any judgments issued by the mili-
tary courts in violation of rights protected by the American Convention and refer
the investigation to a civilian court, which should identify the perpetrators
of the victim's murder and apply the appropriate sanctions. The Court held
that the State cannot invoke the application of a statute of limitations, the prin-
ciple of non-retroactivity of criminal laws, or the ne bis in idem (double jeopardy)
principle to avoid pursuing a criminal investigation. First, crimes against
humanity are neither susceptible to the application of amnesty laws nor
subject to a statute of limitations. Though Chile has not ratified the Convention
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
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Against Humanity 1968,50 which provides that crimes against humanity
are not subject to a statute of limitations, this principle has become a jus cogens
norm which must be respected by that State as an imperative rule of
international law. Second, the ne bis in idem principle is not an absolute
one and can consequently be restricted under certain circumstances,
including: (1) when the court that heard the case and decided on a dismissal or
acquittal of the alleged perpetrators intended to shield the persons charged
from criminal responsibility; (2) when the criminal proceedings were not
conducted independently, impartially or in accordance with due process
principles; or (3) when there was no actual intention of bringing the alleged per-
petrators to justice. In those cases, according to the Court, the judgment ren-
dered 'produces an "apparent" or "fraudulent" res judicatd.5' Moreover, in cases
in which new information is made available regarding the identity of
perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the investigations must be reopened,
even if the case ended with an acquittal of those perpetrators. The Court
held that 'the dictates of justice, the rights of the victims and the spirit and the
wording of the American Convention supersedes the protection of the ne bis
in idem principle'.52 In Almonacid-Arellano, two of the stated conditions were
met. First, the investigation was not carried out by an independent and impartial
tribunal. Second, an amnesty law was applied with the intention of
excluding the criminal responsibility of the perpetrators of the victim's murder.
Thus, the Court found that the State could not argue that the application of
a statute of limitations or the principles of non-retroactivity of criminal laws
or ne bis in idem justified the failure to prosecute and punish the perpetrators
of the victim's murder.
5. Extradition and the Principle Au DededeAu Punire
Another interesting development in the case law of the Inter-American
Court with regard to the duty to investigate crimes against humanity is analysed
in Goiburii et al. In that case, the Court found that the duty to investigate
crimes against humanity, such as forced disappearance, includes the
obligation to request the extradition of alleged perpetrators who are not within
the jurisdiction of the State. In Goibur et al, at least two of the alleged
perpetrators, General Alfredo Stroessner, former President of Paraguay, and
Sabino Augusto Montanaro, former Minister of Interior, were granted asylum
in Brazil and Honduras respectively. On several occasions, the victims' next of
kin requested that Paraguay ask for the extradition of Stroessner and
50 754 UNTS 73.
51 Almonacid-Arellano, supra n. 2 at para. 154.
52 Ibid.
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Montanaro, to no avail. Although the courts in charge of the criminal investiga-
tion requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to proceed with the extradition
request, at the time of the Court's decision it was unclear if the State had
done so. Moreover, as the Court acknowledged, former President Stroessner
passed away in Brazil on 16 August 2006. The Court also noted that there
was no evidence of criminal investigations initiated in Brazil or Honduras to
prosecute Stroessner and Montanaro for the alleged perpetration of crimes
against humanity.
The Court held that, given the nature of the crimes involved in Goiburt et al
and the corresponding obligation under international law to punish the
perpetrators of those human rights violations, Article 1(1) of the American
Convention imposed upon Paraguay a 'compulsory obligation to have requested
the extradition of the accused promptly and with due diligence''5 3 Lack of extra-
dition treaties with the States where the alleged perpetrators of crimes against
humanity are residing should not prevent the State from proceeding with
the request. According to the Court, access to justice is a jus cogens norm and,
as such, creates an erga omnes obligation upon States to cooperate in ensuring
that these crimes do not remain unpunished. Furthermore, the State Parties
to the American Convention cannot grant protection to those accused of
crimes against humanity. On the contrary,
the mechanisms of collective guarantee established in the American
Convention, together with the regional and universal international
obligations on this issue, bind the States of the region to collaborate in
good faith in this respect, either by conceding extradition or prosecuting
those responsible for the facts of this case in their territory.
54
As part of the reparations, the Court ordered Paraguay to remove all the defacto
and de jure obstacles that have impeded the criminal investigation of the alleged
perpetrators of the victims' forced disappearances. The State was also ordered
to expedite the criminal investigation by requesting the extradition of
Mr Montanaro and completing the proceedings in this case. In addition,
Paraguay and the other States Parties to the Convention should
collaborate to eliminate the impunity of the violations committed in
this case by the prosecution and, if applicable, punishment of those
responsible and should collaborate in good faith either through the
extradition of those responsible for the facts or by prosecuting them on
their own territory.
55
53 Goibur6 et al., supra n. 3 at para. 130.
54 Ibid. at para. 132.
55 Ibid. at para. 192, operative para. 5.
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6. The Prohibition of Forced Disappearances in
International Law
In Serrano Cruz Sisters and Goiburti et al., the Court asserted that 'forced
disappearance' as an autonomous and continuous human rights violation
under international law developed in the 1970's. Although the Court had
characterised a forced disappearance as a multiple and continuous violation of
several rights in other cases before these decisions,5 6 it was not apparent in
the existing case law at what point this autonomous human rights violation
became enforceable against States, considering that the existing international
treaties and declarations on this crime were only adopted in the early 1990s
57
and most recently in 2006.58
In Serrano Cruz Sisters, El Salvador challenged the characterisation of the
alleged capture and subsequent disappearance of the minor victims as a
forced disappearance, defined as a continuous and permanent human rights
violation of multiple rights. The State argued that if the Court accepted this
characterisation it would be applying retroactively a definition that was adopted
internationally in the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
From Enforced Disappearances and the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearances to facts that occurred in 1982, in violation of the principles of
non-retroactivity of the law and the principle of legality. The Court concluded
that even if the UN Declaration and the Convention on Forced Disappearances
were only adopted in the 1990's, there has been since the 1970's enough State
practice reflected in the universal and regional human rights mechanisms con-
sidering forced disappearance as an autonomous, continuing and permanent
crime involving multiple violations of several rights. Moreover, State practice
also showed that a pattern of forced disappearances was considered a crime
against humanity at that time. Finally, the Court concluded that since a forced
disappearance involved the violation of several fundamental rights protected
by the American Convention, including the rights to liberty, humane treatment
and life, it was not necessary that a State had ratified the Convention on Forced
Disappearances for the Court to find that State internationally responsible for
the perpetration of such forced disappearance. Ultimately, the Court found that
it lacked jurisdiction rationae temporis to hear the facts surrounding the forced
disappearance, but in its reasoning made clear that forced disappearances had
56 See Veldsquez-Rodriguez v Honduras IACtHR Series C 4 (1988) at paras 155-57; Godinez-Cruz v
Honduras IACtHR Series C 5 (1989) at paras 163-65; Blake v Guatemala, Preliminary
Objections, IACtHR Series C 27 (1996): 5 IHRR 414 (1997) at para. 35; and Bdmaca-Veldsquez
v Guatemala IACtHR Series C 70 (2000); 9 IHRR 80 (2002) at para. 128.
57 The United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances GA Res. 47/113, 18 December 1992, A/RES/47/133; and the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearances were adopted in 1992 and 1994, respectively.
58 The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
was adopted in 2006: see GA Res. 61/177, 20 December 2006, A/RES/61/177; 14 IHRR
582 (2007).
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been outlawed in international law before treaties prohibiting this crime were
adopted.
The conclusion of the Court in Serrano Cruz Sisters was reaffirmed
by Paraguay when it acknowledged that the facts that transpired in the
Goibur et al. Case were forced disappearances even though they were
perpetrated in the 1970's. Paraguay asserted that forced disappearances
constitute a continuous violation of multiple human rights and thereby
accepted that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the facts of this case. The
Court stated that Paraguay's acknowledgment of international responsibility
contributed 'to strengthening a perception of the international community
and, in particular the inter-American System, that recognises the gravity and
the continuing and permanent and autonomous nature of the crime of
forced disappearances of persons',5 9 Additionally, the Court reiterated that
the perpetration of a forced disappearance as part of a pattern or practice
constitutes a crime against humanity. The Court concluded that, considering
the gravity of the crime and the nature of the rights violated, the prohibition
of the forced disappearance of persons and the corresponding obligation to
investigate and punish the perpetrators has attained jus cogens status.
Both in Serrano Cruz Sisters and in Goibur6 et al., the Court reasserted that
a practice of forced disappearances tolerated by the State involves
aggravated international responsibility of that State.60 In Goiburti et al.,
for example, the Court found that because the victims' disappearance was
the result of a systematic practice of illegal detentions, torture, and forced
disappearances carried out within the framework of 'Operation Condor',
a criminal inter-state organisation that practiced 'State terrorism' at an
inter-State level, it entailed an aggravated responsibility of that State.
7. Conclusion
At the time the facts in the three analysed cases transpired, it was never
thought that they could eventually be reviewed by the Inter-American Court.
Indeed, when the three respondent States recognised the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court and inserted temporal limitations to their acceptance of
that jurisdiction, they acted upon the understanding that the temporal limita-
tions were sufficient to shield them from being brought before the Court
to account for gross human rights violations perpetrated before their
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. The decisions adopted in Serrano Cruz
Sisters, Almonacid-Arellano et al. and GoiburM et al. however, show the
59 Goibur et al., supra n. 3 at para. 81.
60 The Court had ruled similarly in Molina Theissen v Guatemala Reparations, IACtHR Series C
108; 13 IHRR 1017 (2006) at para. 41, which involved the forced disappearance of a minor
during the international armed conflict that affected Guatemala in the 1980's.
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willingness of international tribunals such as the Inter-American Court to
assert jurisdiction, at least in regard to certain acts committed in the past that
would otherwise attract absolute impunity. The cases also show the
dilemmas faced by this tribunal when having to weigh the plight of thousands
of victims in internal armed conflicts such as El Salvador against rigid
limitations set by a state to its consent to the jurisdiction rationae temporis
of the Court.
Finally, the cases analysed indicate the Court's tendency to interpret the
obligations arising under the American Convention in light of other develop-
ments of international law, such as the notion of crimes against humanity,
the principle au dedede au punire, and the autonomous nature of forced disap-
pearances. It is important to stress that the decisions of the Court are not
made in a political vacuum, as many countries in the region that faced gross
human rights violations have made bold moves to prosecute the perpetrators
of those heinous crimes. However, it is worth recognising that the Inter-
American Court, through its decisions, is contributing to the establishment
of the truth and a certain sense of accountability in those States in which
victims have not yet been able to find justice and judicial protection.
